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Diagnostic microbial isolates of bio-safety levels 3 and 4 are difficult to handle in medical field camps under military
deployment settings. International transport of such isolates is challenging due to restrictions by the International
Air Transport Association. An alternative option might be inactivation and sequencing of the pathogen at the
deployment site with subsequent sequence-based revitalization in well-equipped laboratories in the home country
for further scientific assessment.
A literature review was written based on a PubMed search.
First described for poliovirus in 2002, de novo synthesis of pathogens based on their sequence information has
become a well-established procedure in science. Successful syntheses have been demonstrated for both viruses
and prokaryotes. However, the technology is not yet available for routine diagnostic purposes.
Due to the potential utility of diagnostic sequencing and sequence-based de novo synthesis of pathogens,
it seems worthwhile to establish the technology for diagnostic purposes over the intermediate term. This is
particularly true for resource-restricted deployment settings, where safe handling of harmful
pathogens cannot always be guaranteed.
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During military deployment, close proximity of individ-
uals within field camps, restricted hygiene options dur-
ing more robust military operations, new environments
and interactions between people and animals on site can
lead to contagion with an infectious disease followed by
an outbreak in the camp [1–8]. This pattern has been
observed in a number of military situations as demon-
strated by the following examples: an outbreak of hook-
worm infection during military operations in Grenada
(1), an outbreak of malaria in US Marines serving in
Somalia (2), an outbreak of Norwalk-like virus (NLV) in
US ground troops deployed to Iraq in 1991 (3) and an
outbreak of influenza virus in camps during World War
I that killed approximately 100,000 troops (4). In* Correspondence: azautne@gwdg.de
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creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/addition, gastrointestinal outbreaks caused by Norovirus,
parasites and bacteria among military officers boarding
navy ships have been widely reported (5).
To date, these outbreaks have been managed and con-
trolled in a timely manner. However, outbreaks of
microbial toxins or bio-safety level (BSL) 3 and 4 patho-
gens, such as Mycobacterium tuberculosis, Ebola, etc. or
with not-yet-characterized newly emerging pathogens of
unknown risk classification, will require transportation
of samples to established laboratories for identification.
However, strict regulations put in place by the Inter-
national Air Transport Association (IATA, www.iata.org)
make the international transport of biological specimens
and isolates challenging. Nevertheless, transfers to labora-
tories in the home country may be desirable, in particular,
if new pathogens of as yet unknown pathogenic potential
are detected.
Next generation sequencing (NGS) is one of the most
promising diagnostic approaches, which allows for rapidarticle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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[9, 10] and for the non-targeted detection of pathogens
directly from primary sample material [11]. NGS-based
ultra-deep sequencing from biological samples or cul-
tured strains is sufficiently deep as to allow for the
reconstruction of the whole pathogen genomes. In
addition, upon successful sequence analysis at the de-
ployment site, sequences are more easily transferred to
the home country through the internet than as physical
microbial isolates. Scientists in the receiving laboratory
are able to analyze the raw sequence data and identify
the pathogen under investigation.
In this review article, we discuss the importance of




Since the heyday of Sanger sequencing, sequencing tech-
nologies have undergone considerable progress, thus
currently allowing for the affordable sequencing of
whole pathogen genomes [12, 13]. Although Sanger
sequencing, based on slab gel electrophoresis and auto-
matic multicapillary electrophoresis systems, is still used
for the analysis of the human genome [14], new ap-
proaches allow for analysis of whole genomes within
hours to few days [14, 15]. Such NGS technologies in-
clude cyclic array, hybridization-based, nanopore and
single molecule sequencing [14] and have been commer-
cialized by companies such as 454 Life Sciences, Applied
Biosystems, Danaher Motion Co., Helicos Biosciences,
Illumina, Oxford Nanopore Technologies and Pacific
Biosciences.
The technological principles of the different NGS
approaches have been detailed elsewhere. In short,
cyclic-array sequencing is based on library preparation
by random DNA fragmentation, ligation of common
adaptor sequences, spatial gathering of clonally clustered
amplicons on planar substrates or on microbeads, emul-
sion amplification, and enzyme catalyzed elongation
followed by spectral imaging based on sequencing-by-
synthesis technology [16]. So-called 454 sequencing [17]
combines PCR-based cloning and pyrosequencing [18].
Bridge PCR-based sequencing is based on the prepar-
ation of clonal libraries, immobilization of forward and
reverse primers onto solid planar substrates using flexible
linkers and cyclic single base extension with subsequent
interrogation of the results [19]. The sequencing-by-
hybridization approach begins with clonal sequencing in
emulsion PCR, followed by differential hybridization of
labeled nucleic acid fragments to an array of oligonucleo-
tide probes [20]. Hybridized-primer/template pairs for
single molecule sequencing are produced by the prepar-
ation of large quantities of poly (dA), possessing singlestranded DNA templates, with subsequent hybridization
to tethered poly (dT) primers on glass substrates [21]. Last
but not least, the nanopore approach allows for massively
parallel, high throughput sequencing of label-free single
molecules by direct electrical identification of DNA bases
[22]. Ongoing automation has led to further dramatic de-
creases in sequencing costs from approximately 100,000 €
per human genome to as low as 1000 € [14].
Obtaining high-quality sequences by NGS – a
pre-requisite for subsequent pathogen design
If sufficient sequencing depth can be guaranteed, NGS
allows for a non-specific screening for infectious agents
in biological samples without the need for an initial sus-
picion of a certain infection. In the past, associations of
microbial pathogens with diseases of unknown etiology
could be demonstrated [11]. Likewise, NGS technology
might be used for the detection of completely unknown
pathogens within samples. Particularly in times of rap-
idly decreasing sequencing costs, the use of laser-printer
sized bench-top NGS devices at deployment sites might
be a realistic goal over the intermediate term. However,
sequence quality is not identical for all NGS approaches
described above. Recently, other authors have compared
the bench-top device 454 GS Junior (Roche, Basel,
Switzerland), MiSeq (Illumina, San Diego, CA, USA)
and Ion Torrent PGM (Life Technologies, Grand Island,
NY, USA) [23]. The MiSeq (Illumina) system showed the
best results regarding throughput per run and error
rates, whereas both the 454 GS Junior (Roche) and the
Ion Torrent PGM (Life Technologies) systems had limi-
tations due to homopolymer-associated indel errors [23].
Technological development is still ongoing in this field.
Sophisticated down-stream data analysis is at present a
further limitation of broad applications of NGS technol-
ogy in the routine diagnostic setting. Data analysis is still
relatively challenging, not user-friendly, and requires
large teams of skilled scientists, bioinformaticians, and
technical assistants [24]. Over the intermediate term, on-
going automation might allow NGS to become user-
friendlier and thus useful for routine diagnostic situations.
Reconstruction of pathogen genomes
Based on the transmitted sequences, circular DNAs
(cDNAs) can be synthesized de novo by assembling oligo-
nucleotides of plus and minus strand polarity in the home
country. The underlying technology, called “DNA shuf-
fling”, was described as early as 1995. In short, 40-base-
pair oligonucleotides with overlapping ends are chemically
synthesized; this method is comparable to primer synthe-
sis for PCR. Thermal cycling and polymerase are subse-
quently used to link the oligonucleotides. If the resulting
sequence is designed with flanked ends that match a plas-
mid palindrome sequence, they can be inserted into a
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cation [25]. If the inserted sequence codes for a virus, it
can be assembled within the cell as shown for the exam-
ples described below.
Using transformation, genetic elements can be in-
corporated into a variety of different cells that serve
as expression vectors. For example, bacteria have ac-
quired the ability to express foreign DNA naturally
since the origins of life more than three billion years
ago and incorporation of transposable genetic ele-
ments into yeast cells is a well-established procedure
in biotechnology [26, 27].
Successfully revitalized pathogens
In 2002, replicative infectious polioviruses were artifi-
cially created in a cell-free in vitro environment based
solely on synthetic poliovirus cDNA molecules, a mile-
stone in medical science. This was the first demonstra-
tion of the synthesis of an infectious agent using in vitro
biochemical means to follow a written sequence. Cur-
rently, complete synthetic design of a virus can be per-
formed within 8 weeks [28, 29].
In addition to whole pathogen genomes, it is also pos-
sible to clone single genes in bacterial vectors, allowing
for the design of reassortant strains using reverse genet-
ics methods. Such cloning is particularly suitable for
pathogens with segmented genomes, e.g., influenza vi-
ruses [30]. Such new designs are usually of use as vac-
cine candidates. Similarly, virus-like particles (VLP)
containing triple hemagglutinin for influenza vaccination
were derived from recombinant baculovirus [31].
As an example of the revitalization of pathogens for
pathogenicity research, the 1918 influenza virus, the
causative agent of the so-called “Spanish flu”, was syn-
thesized by DNA shuffling [32, 33]. Sequence informa-
tion of high pathogenicity linked to 3 loci of the viral
genome was preserved in permafrost soil for more than
90 years [32]. The experiments impressively demon-
strated that no virus is truly extinct as long as its genetic
information is still available.
Much attention was paid to the introduction of syn-
thetic pathogens with artificially altered pathogenicity. In
2001, a recombinant ectromelia virus expressing mouse
interleukin 4 was introduced. Co-infection with IL-4-
expressing ectromelia virus and mousepox virus leads to
suppression of cytolytic lymphocyte responses and con-
secutive breakdown of resistance to mousepox in labora-
tory animals [34, 35]. The experiments resulted in public
fear of the dual-use potential of genetically modified or-
ganisms (GMO) [36].
In contrast, modified viruses can also have beneficial ef-
fects that can be used for therapeutic strategies over the
intermediate or long term, e.g., modified oncolytic herpes
simplex virus in combination with interleukin-12 led tolysis of glioblastoma cells [37] and a modified adenovirus
was shown to influence tumor cell growth [38].
Coxsackievirus B3 (CVB3) M2 is an example of an
RNA-virus that was sequenced and translated into cDNA.
For revitalization, the pCVB3-M2 plasmid can be easily
transfected into HeLa cells [39]. Use of plasmid-generated
viruses allows the easy construction of chimeric viruses
[40], which can be used to determine replication patterns
[40] and cell tropism [41].
The de novo in vitro synthesis of bacterial pathogens
based on their sequence information has been demon-
strated in other experiments [42–44]. For example, syn-
thetic bacterial design by mega-cloning is based on
amplification of circular genomes in yeast cells [45].
Synthetic biology – a tool for the future
The underlying up-to-date options available for synthetic
biology have recently been extensively reviewed [46].
These options comprise techniques of whole genome as-
sembly, which is usually performed in yeast cells [47],
and activation of artificially designed genomes [44]. De
novo genome synthesis, which has been used to design a
583-kb-genome of Mycoplasma genitalum [42] and a
1.1 Mb-genome of Mycoplasma mycoides [48], requires
a variety of synthesis and assembly steps, which have
been detailed elsewhere [42, 48–53]. However, if the de-
sired sequences exist in nature, or are available as tem-
plates, amplification of the required sequences for the
assembly process is more convenient and cost-effective
than de novo design [46].
Although in vitro assembly of large-sized genetic ele-
ments, e.g., by Gibson Assembly with amplification by
PCR or rolling-circle amplification approaches, is pos-
sible in principle, it is prone to a higher mutation fre-
quency than cloning in yeast cells. In vivo genome
assembly in yeast cells has therefore been chosen for the
de novo synthesis of the bacterial genomes described
above [42, 48]. Factors that affect the cloning capacity of
whole genomes in yeast cells include the absence of
toxic expression, genome size and GC content [46].
After the design and assembly of a genome, its activa-
tion requires a suitable environment, which is usually
provided by implantation into appropriate enucleated
target cells. If the environment is not suitable, activation
fails and the recipient cell is not transformed. Factors
that can affect genome activation include the presence
or absence of nuclease activity, the presence of a cell
wall, genome size, and similarity between donor and re-
cipient species [46]. Cell-free genome activation will be
the goal of future research but has not yet been achieved
for complex bacterial genomes [54–56].
Although the approaches taken by synthetic biologists
ultimately target design and modification of new organ-
isms [46], such highly ambitious goals are unnecessary
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setting.
Discussion
Several scientific milestones were necessary to come to
the current point of synthetic design of microbial patho-
gens, beginning with the understanding of bacterial and
viral gene transfer [14]. Milestones for the deciphering
of the principles of gene transfer include description of
the transforming principle by Frederick Griffith in 1928,
identification of DNA as the carrier of genetic informa-
tion by Avery, MacLeod, and McCarty in 1944, identifi-
cation of transduction as a mechanism of genetic
transfer by Lederberg in 1952, description of the double-
helix structure of DNA by Watson and Crick in 1953,
identification of inherited genetic mutation as a result of
viral infection in 1961 by Temin, the first documented
heritable gene transfer in mammalian cell lines in 1962
by Szybalski, demonstration of virus-mediated gene
transfer by Rogers & Pfuderer in 1968, the first gene
transfer into humans in 1989 by Rosenberg, the first
approved gene-therapy-based product for clinical use in
China in 2003, and a first successful clinical phase III
gene therapy trial in the European Union in 2009 [14].
Following from this research, introduction of extraneous
nucleic acid sequences into cells became possible, cul-
minating in de novo design of viruses based on their nu-
cleic acid sequence [17].
Revitalization of microorganisms based on their se-
quence information is of importance for diagnostic pur-
poses if the pathogenic potential of an isolated strain is
to be assessed under in vitro conditions. In a military
deployment setting, a newly isolated strain from a de-
ployment site can be inactivated to be of no more harm
for medical laboratory scientists who have to handle it
under restricted deployment conditions. After sequen-
cing and transferring the sequence data to the home
country, the strain can be revitalized under BSL-3 or
BSL-4 laboratory conditions using de novo synthesized
DNA molecules. Inactivation at the site of isolation
with subsequent revitalization at a site that is safe for
further investigation will considerably reduce the risk
of nosocomial laboratory infections on deployment.
To the authors’ best knowledge, at present, no military
medical service uses technologies to inactivate a patho-
gen, to analyze it using NGS to synthesize cDNAs, and
to revitalize it at another place under safe laboratory
conditions. Such technological approaches are currently
considered scientific top-end and are very expensive.
Nevertheless, evaluation of such technologies for diag-
nostic purposes by the armed medical services seems
desirable. Standardization is also widely missing. Ac-
cordingly, any future diagnostic use of technologies de-
scribed herein will require considerable evaluation andstandardization work and will have to account for se-
quencing errors [12], as detailed above, due to insuffi-
ciencies in the existing technology.
Conclusions
A structured evaluation and standardization of diagnos-
tic in vitro revitalization of inactivated pathogens by the
armed medical services will require a joint multi-
national approach to be cost-effective. The potentials of
such an approach for international diagnostic and scien-
tific cooperation, in the case of the appearance of a
harmful new pathogen, might be worth the effort. Over
the long term, microbiological strain collections could
be completely replaced by sequence databases, and inter-
national strain exchanges could be realized by a simple
mouse click.
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